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Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Montana Dept. of Envtl. Quality: 




 Oral arguments are scheduled for Wednesday, March 13, 
2019, at 9:30 a.m. in the Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, 
Joseph P. Mazurek Justice Building in Helena, Montana.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 This case presents the following issues: 1) whether the 
Montana Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) acted 
unlawfully when it allowed a strip mine to renew its permit with far 
lower pollution control requirements by recognizing receiving 
waters as ephemeral streams; and 2) whether the monitoring 
program MDEQ did require was too lenient and not representative 
of the total discharges. This appeal presents an opportunity to clarify 
MDEQ powers and has ramifications sounding in both agency 
powers and potential environmental quality consequences for 
Montana’s waters and mining industry. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 Under the Clean Water Act, states are charged with 
regulating pollution discharge into their waterways.1 The Montana 
Water Quality Act (the Act) vitalized the state’s responsibility and 
empowered the MDEQ to administer permits regulating those 
discharges.2 Furthermore, the Act charged the Board of 
Environmental Review (BER) with classifying the state’s 
waterways, from A-1 to F-1, indicating most beneficial uses to least 
beneficial uses.3 In 2012, Western Energy (WeCo), operators of the 
25,000 acre Rosebud Mine, applied for a renewal of their discharge 
permit for wastewater into East Armells Creek and its surrounding 
waters, classified by the BER as C-3 waters. Mont. Admin. R. 
17.30.629(1) requires that: “Waters classified C-3 are to be 
maintained suitable for bathing, swimming, and recreation, and 
growth and propagation of non-salmonid fishes and associated 
aquatic life, waterfowl, and furbearers. The quality of these waters 
is naturally marginal for drinking, culinary, and food processing 
purposes, agriculture, and industrial water supply.” 
 
                                                          
1 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2018).  
2 MONT. CODE ANN. § 75–5–102(1) (2017). 
3 Id.  
81 MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE Vol. 79 
 
 
  MDEQ ultimately approved the permit and decided that 
certain discharge standards did not need to be met, determining the 
waters were ephemeral and therefore outside the purview of 
otherwise  applicable regulations.4 Ephemeral streams are those that 
only flow in response to precipitation or snowmelt and whose entire 
channel is above the water table.5 Because MDEQ made this 
determination, the permit was exempted from many of the standards 
applicable to otherwise C-3 designated waters. 
 
 In making this determination, MDEQ relied on the language 
of Mont. Admin. R. 17.30.637(4): “Treatment requirements for 
discharges to ephemeral streams must be no less than the minimum 
treatment requirements set forth in ARM 17.30.1203. Ephemeral 
streams are subject to ARM 17.30.635 through 17.30.637, 
17.30.640, 17.30.641, 17.30.645, and 17.30.646 but not to the 
specific water quality standards of ARM 17.30.620 through 
17.30.629.” The permit also allowed for representative testing at 
only a portion of the 151 outfalls at the discharge site.6 MDEQ 
approved this condition because of perceived difficulties accessing 
every outfall during a large precipitation event during precipitation-
driven discharges.7 
 
 After the modification and issuance of the renewed permit in 
2014, plaintiff-appellees filed suit, alleging that the permit 
essentially reclassified the waters from C-3 to E-1 and far exceeded 
MDEQ’s authority.8  In 2016, the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and invalidated the permit, ruling 
that MDEQ arbitrarily overstepped its authorization both in 
reclassifying the streams and in the representative monitoring 
program the permit allowed.9 Appellants then filed this appeal on 
both issues. 
 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
A.  Appellants’ (MDEQ and WeCo) Arguments 
 
 Appellants argue that the district court applied an incorrect 
standard when evaluating MDEQ’s decision and that the court 
                                                          
4 Appellant’s (MDEQ) Opening Brief at 2, Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. 
Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/L3X2-LLM5 (June 13, 2018) 
(No. DA 18-0110). 
5 Mont. Admin. R. 17.30.602(10). 
6 Id. at 17.30.637(4). 
7 Appellant’s (MDEQ) Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 2. 
8 Id. at 7. 
9 Id. 
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wrongly decided the reclassification of waters was outside MDEQ’s 
purview. Appellants also argue that the representative monitoring 
program the department required was both within MDEQ’s 
authority and supported by relevant data.  
 
1.  Stream Reclassification 
 
 MDEQ and WeCo contend that Mont. Admin. R. 
17.30.637(4) vests MDEQ with authority to lessen treatment 
requirements for streams it determines to be ephemeral and 
therefore outside the scope of some of the permitting process 
requirements. In fact, WeCo argues that MDEQ is not reclassifying 
at all, but is instead simply recognizing the already ephemeral nature 
of the waters at issue.10 They see a distinction between water types 
and classifications.11 Instead of ephemeral referring solely to a 
classification, they assert that ephemeral refers to a type of water 
body independent of the classifications, which they allege are basin-
wide uses.12 Therefore, when MDEQ allowed the permit, it simply 
took note of the waters’ existing characteristics rather than 
reclassifying the streams. 
 They state that without allowing this discretion, the 
permitting process will be over-cumbersome and strip MDEQ of the 
ability to make reasonable determinations.13 They view MDEQ’s 
mandate from the Board as flexible in order to account for individual 
stream variations that may not be reflected through the basin-wide 
classifications.14 They argue that by not adopting this view, the 
district court has rendered Mont. Admin. R. 17.30.637(4) 
superfluous and contrary to the principles of statutory 
interpretation.15 
 
2.  Representative Outfall Monitoring 
 
                                                          
10 Id. at 11. 
11 Appellant’s (WeCo) Opening Brief at 29, Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. 
v. Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/W53M-5V57 (June 13, 
2018) (No. DA 18-0110). 
12 Id. at 29–30. 
13 Appellant’s (MDEQ) Reply Brief at 13, Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. 
Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/C6RR-U8M6 (Jan. 11, 2019) 
(No. DA 18-0110); Appellant’s (WeCO) Opening Brief, supra note 11, at 26 (if 
decision is affirmed “permits (from all types of industry as well as from public 
utilities) will be upended”).  
14 Appellant’s (WeCo) Reply Brief at 9, Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. 
Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/6KCA-TT9Z (Jan. 11, 2019) 
(No. DA 18-0110). 
15 Id. at 14. 
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 Appellants assert that the representative program adopted in 
the permit was fully within MDEQ’s discretion.16 So long as that 
decision is not random and unreasonable, MDEQ can issue permits 
with monitoring requirements that do not sample every single 
outfall.17 They assert that the decision is not unreasonable and cite 
as an example a similar Maryland monitoring program where such 
monitoring was allowed so long as the sampled locations 
represented the total discharge activity.18   
 
 They also argue that the program adopted was, in fact, 
representative of the total outfalls.19 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(j)(1) 
provides that when monitoring the use of samples, those samples 
“shall be representative of the monitored activity.”20 So long as the 
samples are materially like the outfalls they represent, these samples 
meet these requirements.21 Therefore, because the system adopted 
has representative value, according to WeCo, MDEQ should be 
afforded discretion, and the Court should allow the monitoring 
program the permit adopted.22 Furthermore, WeCo argues that the 
system actually prevents “arbitrary and capricious regulation of dry 
gullies where no life occurs.”23      
 
B.  Appellees’ (MEIC) Argument 
 
 Appellees argue that the decision should be affirmed because 
MDEQ’s decision to reclassify the receiving waters was not within 
the Department’s authority, as the decision to reclassify lies with the 
BER. Further, reclassification requires a use attainability analysis 
(UAA) as part of the rule-making process. Appellees assert that the 
process followed ignored the Department’s own studies and 
included no analysis of the water’s actual character.24 Appellants 
further argue that the Department’s monitoring program for the 
permit was arbitrary and without any information or analysis 
regarding the monitoring program.25  
 
                                                          
16 Appellant’s (MDEQ) Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 22. 
17 Id. at 22. 
18 Id. (citing Maryland Dep’t of the Env’t v. Riverkeeper, 134 A.3d 892 
(Md. 2016)).  
19 Id. at 22. 
20 Appellant’s (WeCo) Opening Brief, supra note 11, at 42. 
21 Id. at 43. 
22 Id. at 44. 
23 Appellant’s (WeCo) Reply Brief, supra note 14, at 9. 
24 Appellees’ Combined Response Brief at 31–32, Montana Envtl. Info. 
Ctr. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/KHN4-V8CY (Sept. 11, 
2018) (No. DA 18-0110). 
25 Id. at 32. 
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1.  Stream Reclassification 
 
 Appellees primarily rely upon Mont. Admin. R. 
17.30.615(2), which states that the BER has the sole authority to 
classify streams and change water quality standards.26 Specifically, 
the BER must conduct a UAA, even when changing a stream’s 
designation to ephemeral.27 Because MDEQ’s decision functionally 
reclassifies the receiving waters, it impedes upon the BER process 
and the public’s right to notice and comment.28 Because MDEQ 
ignored these limitations on its authority, Appellees argue that it 
failed to take the “hard look” required and did not consider and 
reasonably analyze relevant data.29 
 
 Likewise, Appellees argue that MDEQ is not entitled to 
deference because the rule at issue was promulgated by the EPA and 
BER, and not the Department. Appellees view the rule at issue as 
BER’s, rather than MDEQ’s.30 Because it is not MDEQ’s rule the 
Department is interpreting, MDEQ cannot determine how it should 
be applied and must follow BER’s interpretation and the purpose of 
the rule.31  
 
 Appellees also contend that, even if it is MDEQ’s rule to 
interpret, according to Clark Fork I32 the Department deserves no 
deference where its interpretation of law is incorrect.33 They argue 
that MDEQ is incorrectly interpreting Mont. Admin. R. 
17.30.637(4) in a way that is contrary to both the purposes of the 
BER process and the Clean Water Act as a whole.34 Because 
MDEQ’s interpretation defeats the broader statutory purpose, it 
cannot be interpreted that way.35The change effectively exempts 
pollution requirements and if those waters are not in fact ephemeral, 
then pollutants are flowing unrestricted into Montana’s 
headwaters.36 
 
2.  Representative Outfall Monitoring 
 
                                                          
26 Id. at 9. 
27 Id. at 9 (citing Mont. Admin. R. 17.30.615 (1)–(2)). 
28 Id. at 10. 
29 Id. at 29 (citing Clark Fork Coalition v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Quality, 197 P.3d 482 (Mont. 2008)) [hereinafter Clark Fork I]. 
30 Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 24, at 30. 
31 Id. at 39. 
32 197 P.3d at 482. 
33 Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 24, at 39.  
34 Id. at 38, 40. 
35 Id. at 30. 
36 Id. at 40. 
85 MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE Vol. 79 
 
 
 Appellees argue that the monitoring program allowed under 
the permit whereby 20 of 151 outfalls will be examined is outside 
MDEQ’s scope and contrary to MDEQ’s own data.  They assert the 
program is outside MDEQ’s scope because the representative 
scheme is not allowed by governing regulations.37 They also assert 
that representative monitoring programs have only been authorized 
where the discharger was a large municipal water system, rather 
than a private actor, such as is the case here.38 
 
 Appellees argue that the representative monitoring, even if 
allowed, was selected in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner 
because the 20 outfalls were not chosen in a manner supported with 
data.39 Appellees claim that none of the selected outfalls are 
representative on any level other than ease of access.40 They also 
claim that none of the selected outfalls are in areas where active 
mining is occurring (and where risk of pollution is highest), but are 
only in reclamation areas where active mining has ceased and 
therefore results at those outfalls will not be demonstrative.41 
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
 The Court will likely affirm the district court’s decision. On 
the stream reclassification issue, the relatively small weight Mont. 
Admin. R. 17.30.637(4) carries cannot overcome the weight 
afforded to the BER’s UAA process, particularly in light of 
MDEQ’s decision not to analyze the water’s actual nature. Even if 
the Court overturns the decision on reclassification, it is unlikely the 
Court would do the same with representative monitoring. While 
representative monitoring could be allowed, the program adopted by 
MDEQ in this instance lacks analytic support.   
 
 In this instance, data seems to support the contention that at 
least some of the waters were not ephemeral.42 It is hard to imagine 
that the permitting decision survives that error. Even if the 
department has the authority to recognize the ephemeral nature of 
specific waters, that authority does not apply to situations where the 
waters at issue do not meet the definition of such waters under Mont. 
Admin. R. 17.30.602(10), as at least some of the waters surrounding 
                                                          
37 Id. at 40. 
38 Id. at 45–46. 
39 Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 24, at 47–48. 
40 Id. at 25. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 21. 
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East Armells Creek do not meet the definition of ephemeral.43 It 
would be a smoother process if MDEQ could simply claim that the 
permitting action did not reclassify because they exempted the 
waters from C-3 standards, rather than newly designating them as 
E-1 or E-2.44 But this approach ignores the process already afforded 
by law and would render at least some part of the classification 
system pointless, and meets the “clear error in judgment” standard 
required.45  
 
 Additionally, even if the Court does find that MDEQ was 
within its powers to re-recognize the waters, it will likely affirm 
summary judgment on the outfall issue. The law likely supports 
MDEQ’s authority to authorize representative monitoring as it sees 
fit and rightly deserves deference on its representing monitoring 
decisions because those decisions are within the agency mandate as 
contemplated in Clark Fork I. However, this deference does not 
extend to situations where the program adopted is not supported by 
analysis or a representative standard.46 Such a program would be 
arbitrary by definition and therefore would be disallowed.    
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The Court will likely affirm the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment, invalidating the permit entirely due to either the 
reclassification or on the narrower issue of non-representative 
sampling. The Court’s decision will impact water quality and the 
permitting process no matter what it decides. Allowing MDEQ such 
wide discretion would streamline regulatory matters for both the 
Department and the permittees but could have negative effects on 
downstream water quality.47 Limiting MDEQ’s authority slows the 
process, restricts flexibility for changed conditions, and places more 
of a burden on the BER, but ensures the greatest amount of public 
participation and compliance with the Clean Water Act.48 However, 
the procedural and analytical irregularities relating to the actual 
                                                          
43 Id.; but see Appellant’s (WeCo) Reply Brief, supra note 14, at 10 
(disagreeing with the contention that any of the waters are more than 
ephemeral). 
44 Appellant’s (WeCo) Reply Brief, supra note 14, at 11–12. 
45 Clark Fork Coal. v. Dept. of Envtl. Qual., 288 P.3d 183, 190 (Mont. 
2012) [hereinafter Clark Fork II]. 
46 Id. at 189–90. 
47 See Clark Fork Coalition’s Amicus Brief at 3–4, Montana Envtl. 
Info. Ctr. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/9NGC-A3A2 (Sept. 
12, 2018) (No. DA 18-0110).    
48 See Treasure State Resources’ Amicus Brief at 2–5, Montana Envtl. 
Info. Ctr. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/2MY3-4PMR (June 
13, 2018) (No. DA 18-0110).  
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condition of the “ephemeral” waters and the representative outfalls 
make this a challenging test case for those broader issues.    
